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Abstract
Ring signatures are cryptographic protocols designed to allow any member of a group to produce a
signature on behalf of the group, without revealing the individual signer’s identity. This offers group
members a level of anonymity not attainable through generic digital signature schemes. We call this
property ‘plausible deniability’, or anonymity with respect to an anonymity set. We concentrate in
particular on implementing privacy on the blockchain, introducing a unique ring signature scheme
that works with existing blockchain systems.
We implement a unique ring signature (URS) scheme using secp256k1, creating the first implemen-
tation compatible with blockchain libraries in this way, so as for easy implementation as an Ethereum
smart contract.
We review the privacy and security properties offered by the scheme we have constructed, and
compare its efficiency with other commonly suggested approaches to privacy on the blockchain.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Cryptocurrencies
Satoshi Nakamoto2 introduced the world to the proof-of-work blockchain, through the release of the
bitcoin whitepaper in 2008 [65], allowing users and interested parties to consider for the first time
a trustless system, with which it is possible to securely transfer money to untrusted and unknown
recipients. Since its launch, the success of bitcoin has motivated the creation of many other cryp-
tocurrencies, both those built upon bitcoin’s underlying structure [20], [54], and those built entirely
independently [67].
Cryptocurrencies are most simply described as ‘blockchains’ with a corresponding token or coin,
with which you can create transactions that are then verified and stored in a block on the underlying
blockchain.
Figure 1: An illustration of a typical blockchain.
Blocks themselves are formed of a block header, which includes metadata such as the block reference
number, timestamp, and a link back to the previous block; and the block content, where the list of
validated transactions is stored, each containing the transaction value, sender and recipient address.
The blockchain is simply the chain of blocks that have been verified and accepted as valid by the
consensus protocol in play.
Before bitcoin and the blockchain, in 1983, Chaum constructed e-cash, an untraceable electronic
alternative to cash [37]. Chaum’s e-cash differs from the schemes we will explore in that it assumes
existence of a central bank, from which anonymous coins can be withdrawn using blind signatures.
These coins are produced with a bank’s secret key, meaning that the scheme is based on assumptions
both of an honest central bank, and a central secret [37].
The cryptocurrencies that we explore are intended to be analogous to digital cash, with the same
fungibility and anonymity guarantees that are implicit when using fiat currencies such as the pound,
euro, or dollar [18], but without the necessity of a central, issuing authority.
1.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the most popular and successful cryptocurrency, with a total market capitalisation of almost
$10 billion, as of August 2016 [8].
Bitcoin was formed by combining Adam Back’s HashCash puzzles [17] with the established public
key infrastructure, enabling the confirmation of integrity of transactions published to the bitcoin
2A pseudonym.
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blockchain through digital signatures. HashCash puzzles are used as a Proof of Work (PoW) task to
be completed by miners, a connected network of scheme participants, in order to make the cost of
subverting or reversing transactions prohibitively expensive [65].
Figure 2: Market Capitalisation of bitcoin (in USD) [9]
Due to the nature of a PoW algorithm, in order to make a change to a previous transaction,
an adversary would require control of an amount of power equal to the power of all those trying to
contribute to the network honestly. For this reason, it is essential that finding a solution to the given
PoW algorithm is very computationally expensive. In order for blocks to be verified quickly, it is
also generally required that given a solution, it is very efficient to verify that it does satisfy the PoW
algorithm in question.
For bitcoin3, the PoW puzzle is formed, with || representing concatenation:
MSBk[SHA-256(SHA-256(nonce||block contents))] = 0
Miners try to find a nonce such that when combined with the block header of the previous block, and
SHA-256 (taken from the NIST SHA-2 suite [72]) is performed on the product twice, the output is
lower than a dynamically adjusted target (above, the target is 2256−k) [65].
The proof of work algorithm was an attempt to implement a ‘1 CPU, 1 vote’ distribution of power
in the consensus [65], and enables the system to operate without a political or reputational requirement
to be met before a potential miner is able to contribute to the consensus algorithm – a miner must
simply control a sufficient amount of computational power.
The hash target is chosen in proportion to the total amount of hashing power at work across the
network, so that a new block is published approximately every 10 minutes [15]. The target is adjusted
every 2016 blocks (approximately every two weeks) so that mining the next 2016 blocks should take
exactly two weeks, if the total network power does not change [7].
Miners are incentivised to perform these computationally expensive actions through a reward of
12.5 bitcoins per block mined (this reward halves approximately every 4 years – the most recent
halving was July 9th, 2016). In addition to this, transactions can include optional transaction fees
to be rewarded to the miner that includes the given transaction in a block, as additional motivation
for miners to process certain transactions as quickly as possible [65]. A graph of transaction fees as a
percentage of total transaction values is shown in Figure 4 below.
Bitcoin transactions simply grant the recipient the right to spend some currently ‘unspent’ bitcoin
belonging to the sender. This is done through unspent transaction outputs, or UTXOs [65]. This
right is transferred through ECDSA digital signatures, requiring use of a private key to send bitcoin,
3We call both the blockchain system and the unit of currency bitcoin, with no capital letter, unless starting a
sentence.
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Figure 3: The relationship between sender, miner, and recipient.
Figure 4: Fees as a percentage of transaction amounts in bitcoin blocks over time [9].
and a public key to receive bitcoin. The recipient’s public address, formed through taking a hash of
the public key, can also be used in the creation of transactions. The relationship between the three
pieces of information for each given user is shown in Figure 5. We have, as usual, private key x, and
public key y = gx, with g a generator of the group in which we are working.
The arrows along the bottom of the image are labelled with known computationally hard problems.
If both of these hard problems are broken, users will be able to calculate all pieces of information
with knowledge of any one. If ECDLP is broken, in particular, users will be able to calculate others’
private keys from public keys. Public addresses are used as an additional layer of security in case of
this.
Users are referenced in transactions by their bitcoin addresses, of which users can have many,
generally managed by a ‘wallet’. Addresses act as pseudonyms for users. Transactions are issued by
a digital signature on the hash of certain data concerning the current transaction, and this digital
signature and additional transaction data is then stored on the blockchain to be referenced in future
transactions [42].
1.3 Blockchains
The blockchain can be described as an immutable, cumulative ledger, with consensus protocol working
to maintain this ledger of all valid transactions on every node in the network. Every transaction
7
Figure 5: The relationship between private key, public key, and public address.
included in each block is public and immutable.
There are two commonly discussed problems which a blockchain consensus protocol must defend
against:
Byzantine Fault Tolerance. Consensus must hold in the presence of many faulty or badly con-
nected nodes in the network [30].
Sybil Attacks. Consensus must hold even in a network with many nodes with faked or forged iden-
tities – generally assumed to be owned by adversarial individuals [65].
Bitcoin’s protocol works towards achieving consensus under these conditions through the slow and
expensive PoW algorithm, and under the additional requirement of an honest majority. Honest, here,
means that the actor or actors in question follow the protocol as specified. Alternative protocols, such
as a Proof of Stake rather than PoW algorithm, are currently both implemented [12], [58], and being
researched in industry as a way to reach consensus more quickly and with higher security guarantees
[78].
At a very high level, Proof of Stake in its current form generally works with validators instead of
PoW’s miners, committing (or ‘staking’) money in the form of bets on certain blocks being accepted.
These stakes replace the money miners spend on exertion of electricity in the PoW algorithm, leading
to the analogy of staking as ‘virtual mining’. An often cited problem with several possible Proof of
Stake algorithms is the issue of ‘nothing at stake’, meaning parties can act in a way where they can
subvert the consensus algorithm at no cost to themselves.
The bitcoin blockchain is equipped with a restricted programming language, which is used to
enable transactions such as transfer of funds from several input accounts to several output accounts,
including multi-signature accounts and transactions, where several signatures are required before funds
can be released from an account. The scripting language is expressive enough to allow cryptographic
protocols such as secure multi-party computations to be constructed [14].
As bitcoin is primarily a transaction only blockchain, it is wise to restrict the scripting language
to a few well-examined opcodes, as this prevents risks of unknown attacks4.
There are, however, many other issues contributing to the hesitation of widespread adoption of
bitcoin and other public blockchains, including:
The threat of attacks by an anonymous majority or powerful individual. This could take
place in the form of theft or subversion of the consensus algorithm. Blockchain history can
be rewritten if a dishonest party is in control of 51% or more of the network [65]. Other attacks
4Without restrictions or formal verification, scripting languages (such as Ethereum’s Solidity) can lead to unexpected
attacks, such as the $50 million stolen from the DAO, due to a formally unknown recursive call exploit [32]
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Figure 6: Transactions per bitcoin block over time [9].
on the system can be carried out with control of around 25% of the network hashing power [58],
or by groups of any size [45].
Wastefulness and lack of sustainability. In order to make double spending and other blockchain
manipulation prohibitively expensive, the PoW algorithm is very computationally expensive,
and so maintaining the blockchain consumes very large amounts of energy5.
Low transaction rate. Bitcoin’s peak transaction rate is currently 7 transactions per second (tps)
[31]. For comparison, VISA handles an average of around 2000 tps, with peak capacity of 24,000
[11].
Lack of control over the monetary supply, and extreme volatility in currency value. Cryptocurrency
value is determined by market forces, and uncertainty in the new technology often leads to high
volatility. Financial institutions that would otherwise find blockchain technology attractive are
dissuaded by the lack of control over the monetary creation [43]. This problem is resolved
somewhat through the use of private or consortium blockchains.
1.4 Ethereum
In response to the limitations of bitcoin’s restricted scripting language, the Ethereum platform was cre-
ated, offering an almost6 Turing-complete distributed virtual machine atop the Ethereum blockchain
[31], along with a currency called Ether. The increased scripting ability of the system enables devel-
opers to create ‘smart contracts’ on the blockchain, programs with rich functionality and the ability
to operate on the blockchain state. The blockchain state records current ownership of money and of
the local, persistent storage offered by Ethereum. Smart contracts are limited only by the amount of
gas they consume. Gas is a sub-currency of the Ethereum system, existing to impose a limit on the
amount of computational time an individual contract can use [77].
Users specify an upper limit on the amount of gas they are willing to spend, and the price, in
Ether per gas, that they are willing to pay [77]. An overall block gas limit determines how many
computations can be completed per block, and although initially set as a constant, miners have the
5 At $0.125/kWh (US average), hash rate of 100 Mhash/s, power use of 7W, and total bitcoin hash rate of 1,626,365
TH/s, if all miners were using this FPGA [1] in the US‘ to mine, $ would be spent on mining bitcoin every second. Re-
alistically, there are FPGAs more efficient than this, and ASICs are 10-100 times more efficient [41], power consumption
and expenditure may be considerably lower.
6Though not exactly - executions in the Ethereum virtual machine are guaranteed to terminate, as there is an upper
limit imposed on the execution time allowed before a program must halt.
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ability to adjust the block limit by adding or subtracting the variable 11024 × previous block limit to
each new block’s limit [31].
There are two types of account in the Ethereum blockchain system: ‘externally owned’ accounts,
controlled with a private key (like all accounts in the bitcoin system), and ‘contracts’, controlled by
the code that resides in the specific address in question. Contracts have immutable code stored at the
contract address, and additional storage which can be read from and written to by the contract.
An Ethereum transaction contains the destination address, optional data, the gas limit, the se-
quence number and signature authorising the transaction. If the destination address corresponds to
a contract, the contract code is then executed, subject to the gas limit defined above, which allows a
certain number of computational steps before halting.
The ability to form smart contracts is one potential method of addressing the lack of privacy and
corresponding potential lack of fungibility of coins in the Ethereum system. Although cryptocurrencies
provide some privacy with the absence of identity related checks required to buy, mine, or spend
coins, the full transaction history is public, enabling any motivated individual to track and link users’
purchases. This concept heavily decreases the fungibility of cryptocurrencies, allowing very revealing
taint analysis of coins to be performed, and leading to suggestions of blacklisting coins which were
once flagged as stolen [13].
1.5 Privacy
The blockchain privacy model is succinctly explained in the bitcoin whitepaper, and contrasted with
the traditional financial security model as follows. Although transactions are public, as long as
public keys do not become associated with individuals’ off-chain identities, users remain ‘anonymous’.
This unlinking of off-chain identities with virtual addresses and transactions offers blockchain users a
property known as pseudonymity [65].
There are certain advantages offered by a public blockchain - for example, it is possible to track
assets through the blockchain with ‘coloured coins’ [6], and certificates published on the blockchain
enable collectors to verify that they are acquiring a legitimate product.
Others have seen the public nature of transactions as a threat to fungibility and a contradiction
to the otherwise ‘pseudonymous’ nature of bitcoin. In reaction to this, the cryptocurrencies Darkcoin
(now known as Dash [54]), Monero [67], and ShadowCash [3] have been released, and many new
protocols have been suggested as privacy enhancing overlays to the existing bitcoin system, most
notably Bitcoin Core Developer Greg Maxwell’s CoinJoin [61], and the Zerocoin protocol [64].
We explore these schemes and the cryptographic protocols they involve, considering the practicality
and security of each.
1.6 Contributions
We produce a practical implementation of a unique ring signature scheme7, and provide detailed
proofs and intuitive explanations of what security guarantees are provided by the resulting scheme.
We analyse cryptographic protocols and primitives that are currently implemented in blockchain
systems, and review the strengths, vulnerabilities, and the practicality of implementing suggested
improvements. We explore hashing into elliptic curve groups, specifically implementing a scheme to
hash into secp256k1. We work towards constructing and implementing a scheme that enables the
existence of a blockchain system that is transparent enough to guarantee that there are no forged
coins in the system, remains auditable as a whole, but enables privacy for the individual.
7 All code related to this project can be found at https://github.com/rebekah93/secp256k1-urs/.
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2 Background
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Group signatures, ring signatures and their variants are constructed primarily from a few well known
cryptographic primitives. We will first describe and discuss these primitives, so we can more easily
describe the protocols and requirements of the schemes we deal with further on in this paper.
2.1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Until the introduction of Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography and the Elliptic Curve Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem (ECDLP) by Koblitz and Miller in 1985, cryptographic protocols were defined over
multiplicative groups of finite fields.
The advantages of using EC groups rather than finite fields include the efficiency and speed of EC
arithmetic, and the absence of any sub-exponential time algorithms with which to find the discrete
logarithm in an EC group. The ECDLP in the group E(Fq) is believed to be strictly more difficult
than the DLP in finite fields of size q [68].
An elliptic curve, labelled E(Fq), (with characteristic8 6= 2, 3) consists of all the points (x, y) ∈
Fq × Fq that satisfy the following equation:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b, a, b ∈ Fq. (1)
Fq is known as the base field of the group, and the cardinality, or order, of the EC group,
represented n = #E(Fq), is defined as the total number of points (x, y) ∈ E(Fq).
The order of the curve also is the smallest number such that for a generator g ∈ E(Fq), we have
gn = 1.
Arithmetic in elliptic curve groups does not occur as one may naively assume, with (x1, y1) +
(x2, y2) = (x1 + x2, y1 + y2). Instead, point addition takes place through the formulae given below –
the equations used to perform point doubling and scalar multiplication follow from the point addition
formula, and are given in Appendix B. A full description can be found in [63]
Point Addition For simple point addition, (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x3, y3), with (x1 6= x2), we form
(x3, y3) through the following:
For λ =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 , (2)
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, (3)
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1. (4)
It is clear here that λ is formed by taking the gradient of the line joining the two points. Point
doubling replaces λ with the tangential gradient at the point, as explained in Appendix B. Scalar
multiplication occurs through repeated point doubling.
It is useful to note that is EC groups are mathematical groups, they have only one operation –
EC groups are additive groups, meaning although multiplication by a scalar can be computed
through repeated point doublings, there is no multiplication of two points, no exponentiation
and no division. As the schemes we implement are using multiplicative notation, it is important
to be aware of this. Multiplication in suggested algorithms will become point addition, and
exponentiation will become scalar multiplication.
8Characteristic is defined as the number if times the identity element must be added to itself to return the zero
element.
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ECDSA Transactions in blockchain systems such as bitcoin and Ethereum use the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as authentication of a transaction [65]. ECDSA signa-
tures are formed of pairs, (r, s), constructed as shown in Appendix B, and explained in full detail
in [57]. At a high level, these digital signatures fit into the scheme as shown in Figure 3, on page
8.
2.1.2 Assumed Hard Elliptic Curve Problems
As we have seen above, elliptic curve points are additive groups, in contrast to finite fields which are
generally defined over multiplicative groups. This means the notation used when implementing and
discussing schemes over elliptic curve groups differs from the notation given in the papers suggesting
the algorithms. We will informally define the most commonly used cryptographic assumptions using
the additive notation of elliptic curve arithmetic, and then formally explore the assumption that the
scheme we use depends on. All definitions are defined with respect to an adversary A.
Definition 2.1. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
A has no advantage in solving following:
Given Y , G ∈ E(Fq), find x ∈ Z such that Y = x ·G.
Definition 2.2. Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (EC-CDH)
A has no advantage in the following:
Given a ·G, b ·G,∈ E(Fq), a, b ∈ Z, compute ab ·G.
Definition 2.3. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (EC-DDH)
A has no advantage in the following:
Given a ·G, b ·G, c ·G ∈ E(Fq), with a, b, c ∈ Z, decide whether c ·G = ab ·G.
2.1.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Goldwasser et al. introduced ‘zero-knowledge proof of knowledge’ schemes in 1985 [52]. The purpose
of the Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) of knowledge is for a party to prove to a verifier that they know
some secret information (represented below as x) without revealing anything about the secret in the
process.
Goldwasser’s Scheme: Prover and verifier both know (g, h, y1, y2), with g, h 6= 1, g, h ∈ G,
y1 = g
x, y2 = hx, for exponent x ∈ Zq. The scheme runs as follows [52]:
1. Prover chooses r ←R Zq, sends a← gr, b← hr to the verifier.
2. Verifier responds with challenge c←R Zq for the prover.
3. Prover responds, sending t← r − cx mod q to the verifier.
4. Verifier accepts if and only if a = gtyc1 and b = htyc2
For g and h in a group G where the discrete logarithm problem is assumed hard, the scheme above is
both sound and honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
A zero knowledge property would guarantee that no malicious verifier can extract additional
information from the prover. Honest verifier zero knowledge, a weaker property, guarantees that
if the verifier follows the protocol honestly, and chooses the challenge randomly, the zero knowledge
property follows.
Proof of knowledge, as achieved in this scheme, is a property stronger than soundness. Proof
of knowledge guarantees not only that if the verifier is convinced a witness exists (above, r is the
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witness), but also that the prover knows such a witness [22]. The property of soundness, in contrast,
simply guarantees that it is impossible to prove a false statement.
Unique ring signatures rely heavily on Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proofs. In contrast
to the original zero-knowledge proofs, NIZK proofs require only that the two parties have access to a
randomly generated ‘common reference string’.
The Fiat-Shamir transform converts a three round ZKP with interaction and public randomness
needed to determine the challenge into a one round, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge,
with a hash function modelled as a random oracle.
2.1.4 Random Oracle Model
A random oracle (RO) is generally viewed as a ‘black box’ accepting inputs and generating truly
random outputs for them. The random oracle records the outputs corresponding to each input queried,
so that the same input will always return the same output. The random oracle model is an
assumption that there exists a random oracle producing a truly random output.
Random oracles are typically modelled with hash functions in practice, leading to some criticism –
hash functions have a deterministic output and so are not truly random, security proofs in the ROM
may not translate to security in a practical environment [53].
The security properties of all linkable, traceable, and unique ring signatures are proved in the
random oracle model, including the one we have implemented9.
The ROM is at the foundation of the security of our scheme, and many others. As an example, the
security of bitcoin mining is dependent on hash functions acting as random oracles – unpredictable,
well distributed, (pseudo) random functions. Similarly, NIZKs are dependent on the common reference
string being modelled as a RO – otherwise a dishonest prover would have a non-negligible chance of
correctly predicting the challenge and forge a proof without having knowledge of the secret.
2.2 Group Signatures
Group signatures were introduced by Chaum and van Heyst in 1991 [38]. They were conceived to
allow any member of a group to produce a signature on behalf of the group, enabling users to sign
with the authority of the group, without revealing the specific signer’s identity.
The concept of a group signature is that a trusted group master or manager is responsible for
setting up a ‘group’ of users, (not related to the abstract mathematical structure of groups – we
simply mean a collection of users of the scheme), who can then each sign messages on behalf of the
whole group, without revealing their individual identity. The group master holds a master key with
the ability to reveal the signer of any signature generated by a group member in the past. As a result
of this, group signatures offer the participants anonymity only under the condition that the group
master does not choose to reveal the signer’s identity [34].
A group signature scheme must satisfy several essential properties:
Anonymity An adversary has no more than a negligible advantage of correctly identifying the indi-
vidual that produced the signature.
Unforgeabilty An adversary without a key has no more than a negligible probability of producing
a signature that verifies correctly.
Collusion resistance Dishonest participants in the group cannot collude to produce a signature
which will verify as another’s signature, and the scheme must offer soundness and correctness
under the signature verification algorithm.
9There are, however, some group and ring signatures that exist without the random oracle model [36]
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Consider the definition of anonymity with respect to a two-party group. Less than a negligible
advantage would mean here that an adversary would guess correctly which individual produced the
signature with probability 12 + ε, for some negligible ε. This means that although the adversary has
negligible advantage, the anonymity set is small and so the definition of anonymity does not align
with our intuitive sense of the word. We therefore call this property plausible deniability. Each signer
can deny that they produced the signature, but the property of ‘anonymity’ that is offered does not
agree with ones intuitive definition of the word.
Although we will avoid detailing a group signature scheme (thorough explanations can be found
in [38], [34], [44]), we will describe possible uses of group signature schemes. For example, a bank
could allow its employees to authorise transactions by signing via a group signature protocol. This
offers the employees privacy from eavesdropping third parties, and reveals nothing to the recipient
other than that it was a bank employee that authorised the transaction. However, for auditability or
in case of a dispute, the group master can reveal the identity of the signer in each disputed or audited
transaction.
Another example is of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), which uses a variant of group signa-
tures, to enable a server to authenticate a trusted platform running remotely on an authorised user’s
laptop, without compromising the individual user’s privacy by requiring their identity [33].
However, group signatures have several limitations. For example, it is impossible for third parties
to know whether or not a series of messages have been signed by the same person – the only way
to link messages would be through the group manager, who would have to revoke the anonymity of
the signer in the process. The linking of messages is an essential property in any mixing scheme, as
it can be used to provide confirmation of whether or not a group signer has already withdrawn the
coins that they have rightful access to. There is also a large overhead when attempting to add or
remove members from an established group, with the group manager or all group members required
to perform a computationally expensive task. The presence of a trusted group manager also restricts
possible use of the protocol.
2.3 Ring Signatures
Ring signatures were first suggested by Rivest et al, who introduced the RST scheme in their 2001
paper, ‘How to Leak a Secret’ [70]. Ring signatures were created in response to the limitations of group
signatures, and in particular they offer honestly participating users with ‘unconditional anonymity’,
and are formed without a complex setup procedure or the requirement for a group manager. They
simply require users to be part of an existing public key infrastructure [16].
Ring Signature Mixing Schemes (RSMSs) allow different sets of blockchain users to generate groups
and signatures on the fly, without requiring any additional trust, at the cost of little added computa-
tional time.
Ring signatures are constructed in a way that the ring can only be ‘completed’, and therefore
verify correctly, if the signer has knowledge of some secret information, most commonly a private key
corresponding to one of the public keys in the ring. In the signature generation algorithm, a number
is generated at random for each of the other public keys in the ring, and then the signer uses the
knowledge of their own private key, or some other ‘trapdoor information’, to close the ring.
Ring signatures offer users a type of anonymity by hiding transactions within a set of others’
transactions. If there are many users contributing very similar amounts to the ring, then the ring is
said to have good liquidity, meaning the transactions can occur quickly, and also that transactions
can be effectively mixed, with a high resistance to attempted mixing analysis attacks.
2.4 Linkable Ring Signatures
Linkable ring signature algorithms provide a scheme that allows users to sign on behalf of a group,
again without revealing the individual signer’s identity, but with the additional property that any
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signatures produced by the same signer, whether signing the same message or different messages,
have an identifier, called a tag, linking the signatures. With this tag, third parties can efficiently
verify that the signatures were produced by the same signer, without learning who that signer is.
2.4.1 Unique Ring Signatures
Unique ring signatures have a tag that links signatures if and only if the signer, message, and ring are
the same across the two signatures. This tag is constructed using the signer’s private key, message, and
description of the ring (most commonly a list of public keys), and enables both other ring members
and third parties to observe whether or not two identical messages have been signed by the same ring
member.
Possible use cases for linkable ring signatures are restricted access archives, for example a journalist
may pay for access to one query from each of a range of topics. By creating a unique ring signature
with the topic as message, this would enable the archive server to allow the journalist appropriate
access, without compromising the individual’s privacy. Extending this example, we would create
‘k-times anonymous access’ [74]. Other potential uses for unique ring signatures including e-voting
schemes without the need for central authorities, and other e-token systems [48].
Unique ring signatures were introduced by Franklin and Zhang in 2012 [48]. The security properties
of this scheme are stated as unforgeability, secure linkability, and restricted anonymity – a
fully anonymous linkable ring signature scheme would be impossible, due to the linkability itself.
These security properties are guaranteed by the collision resistance of the hash functions involved,
and the soundness and completeness of the zero-knowledge proof.
The unique ring signature (URS) scheme results in the “most efficient linkable ring signature in the
random oracle model, for a given level of provable security” [48]. Specifically, this scheme is tightly
reduced to the DDH problem10.
Franklin and Zhang build the security proof of their suggested scheme upon security proofs of
other, well-established schemes, starting from a generic digital signature scheme, and ending with an
abstract unique ring signature over bilinear pairings [48].
3 Motivation
The motivation for increased privacy in cryptocurrencies is self-evident. We wish to enable cryptocur-
rencies to be used with a guarantee of the same level of anonymity that users take for granted with
cash – it can be withdrawn from a bank without the user needing to reveal their intent, and can be
spent without the merchant learning the payer’s identity. This is not yet offered by any cryptocurrency
or e-cash scheme, and certainly is not offered by credit card purchases.
The most commonly considered options for implementing privacy on the blockchain include the
following:
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) All transactions are encrypted in a way that allows transactions
to be easily audited, without revealing the actual value of such transactions. Fully HE is currently
very inefficient, with a billion factor overhead and keys up to 25GB in size [50].
Confidential Transactions (CT), used to hide the value of a given transaction, are implemented
using additively homomorphic encryption, which has less of a computational overhead [67].
Mixing services Coins can be mixed using third party servers. An example mixing scheme is shown
in Figure 7. The CoinJoin scheme has been implemented many times, as it is one of the only mix-
ing solutions available to use without a modification to the bitcoin protocol. An example mixing
service, based on the CoinJoin protocol, is SharedCoin, which was hosted by blockchain.info
10Tight in this setting means that the probability of solving the hard problem on which the security of the scheme
relies is roughly equal to the probability of solving the DDH problem in the same given time period.
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until June 2014 [4], when it was found to be broken [2]. Alternatively, all participating parties
can execute part of the mixing contract, eliminating the need for trusted servers. An exam-
ple of this is JoinMarket, where requests for mixing orders are broadcast over Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) [5]. In July 2015, it was discovered that JoinMarket was incorrectly implemented,
enabling curious parties to perform analysis to link input and output address pairs [10].
Figure 7: A simple mixing contract, used to improve the fungibility of coins.
Cryptocurrencies with privacy by design This could include, for example, an obligation to enter
a mix when performing any transaction – the cryptocurrency may not recognise transactions with
only one input. Such a cryptocurrency could also produce all transactions in ‘zero-knowledge’,
such as ZCash [55].
Access structures We can increase privacy on the blockchain by concealing metadata, or having
transactions only readable to certain parties determined through access control mechanisms.
Traitor tracing This could be implemented in order to punish parties who act to decrease anonymity
of others, in turn increasing the anonymity of the scheme as parties are less likely to act adver-
sarially.
Broadcast encryption This provides a high level of anonymity for receivers, as every user in the
group receives the encrypted message, although only users with the correct permission or key
can decrypt. Broadcast encryption is also perfectly collusion resistant [27].
Secure hardware This can act to limit what the user can do, for example the hardware could
enforce mixing before outputting transactions, or could add randomness such as that used in
blind signatures [37].
Intermediaries For example, depositing and withdrawing money from an exchange removes the
‘traceability’ property.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) This enables parties to act together in a way that no
single one of them has access to all of the data, and hence no one can leak any secret information.
However, inefficiencies are significant and parties are required to behave honestly [79].
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Off-chain storage This would increase privacy on the blockchain by storing sensitive data off-chain
and simply accessing it when needed [79]. Either the storage hosts are trusted, or data is
fragmented and stored across many nodes.
3.1 What could go wrong?
Mixes provide only plausible deniability – the transaction, sender and recipient addresses are all
still public, but are no longer obviously linked, and rather exist as if ‘hidden in a crowd’. The size of
the crowd, or anonymity set, depends on parameters chosen either by the mixing scheme itself [5], or
by the user selecting an anonymity level they are comfortable with.
Due to the definition of anonymity, ring mixes with group size 2 have been proven to provide
the user with ‘anonymity’, as long as the underlying ring signature protocol is provably secure [24].
However, in a blockchain system, this may not be an adequate level of privacy – additional information
is often available and could be used to construct a persona or perform other revealing analysis on each
member of the ring, enabling a motivated adversary to trace the signers as with the pseudonymity
that bitcoin and Ethereum provide.
It is important to note that mixed based protocols rely on a large number of honestly participating
users, in order to offer a desirable level of anonymity. We define anonymity here with respect to an
anonymity set, with a higher number being more desirable and offering ‘stronger’ properties of
anonymity.
In the two-party ring, the anonymity set is of size two. If a user wanted a higher level of anonymity,
they could enter into a chain of mixes, each of which with a size two, to reach the preferred level of
anonymity. For example, entering into eight two-party ring mixing schemes would give the user an
anonymity set of 28, as an adversary would have to deduce which of the two parties is the individual
in question, for each of the eight rings.
Ring signatures are not produced instantaneously, and so it is preferable to allow users to enter
into one large ring, rather than a chain of smaller rings.
3.1.1 The Threat of Sybil Attacks
It is not unreasonable to suggest a motivated attacker may chose to create many accounts and flood
many mixing contracts with the intent to publish all of their public and private keys pairs after the
legitimate party has withdrawn their funds, hence revealing the honest input output address pair.
This attack would be very straight-forward to execute, and a simple overview is shown in the figure
below.
Although ring signatures offer an increased level of anonymity to users, dishonest participants can
remove themselves from the set of possible signers of a formerly signed message by simply revealing
their own private key or tag based on the specific message and ring in question. This would allow
third parties to trivially observe that the given user is not the signer of the original message.
If all but one users in a ring choose to act adversarially and reveal their private key or tag, then
the remaining user is left only with the ‘pseudonymity’ they would receive using bitcoin or a similar
cryptocurrency.
For a ring signature scheme, a straight-forward way to prevent an adversarial ring from revoking
the exculpability of any honest member would be to implement a scheme with blinded signatures.
Chaum’s blinded signatures, first suggested in 1983 [37], work as follows.
For a signer with private key x and public key Y = x ·G, the message is signed with key Y + P ,
with P = p ·G, for some randomly generated p ∈ Zq. The signer also sends a zero knowledge proof of
knowledge of p.
To produce the ring signature, the signer produces a random r ←R Zq for each public key in the
ring, and uses these to form pki +Ri, with Ri = ri ·G as the new public keys to be used to form the
ring.
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Figure 8: An adversary acting as all but one users in a mix
Zero knowledge proofs of each of these random blinding constants are also produced and sent with
the signature to the verifier.
If this is done correctly, the non-signing parties will not be able to generate tags with which to
compare and prove that they are not the signer in question, as they will not be aware of the Ri used
in conjunction with their pubic key. If the signer also forgets the blinding constants, they will not
be able to incriminate themselves even if asked to. However, it is unclear whether this scheme would
work with linkable or unique ring signatures.
3.1.2 Failed Mixing Attempts
Dash and SharedCoin both relied on third parties to host implementations of the CoinJoin mixing
protocol. For Dash, then known as DarkCoin, nodes were not willing to host the ‘DarkSend’ mixing
feature, and so five ‘masternodes’ were chosen to provide mixing services to the whole network, and
in turn these nodes were promised a reward. These five nodes form an easy and attractive target
for attacks, and could have chosen to collude and act adversarially, logging or publishing all the
information collected about the input-output pairs in each mix. The service is now called PrivateSend,
and all nodes on the network are required to run the mixing protocol. In exchange for this service,
45% of all block rewards go to the nodes that provided the mixing.
SharedCoin was a service hosted by blockchain.info, which has also been broken. In this case,
an eavesdropping adversary could easily trace input-output pairs, based on transaction values and
analysis explained in CoinJoin Sudoku [2].
In JoinMarket [5], all users wishing to join the mix broadcast their intentions over an IRC channel,
and then all act as the mixing server. There is, however, a security problem with these mixing schemes,
under the threat model of an active adversary who sets up rings and simply collects messages and
input-output address pairs, without ever executing the mixing protocol. This adversary can collect
valuable information about transactions while never executing the mixer, meaning the information is
collected at no cost [10].
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3.1.3 Low Power Problems
It is easy to see that the more legitimate hashing power contributing to a given network, the more
computationally expensive an attack would be. If this expense is large enough, an attacker would be
crippled trying to gain a sufficient11 amount of hashing power, and so the honest majority will cause
the blockchain to grow legitimately.
However, for some smaller alt-coins, the expenditure required to gain a sufficient amount of hashing
power is not large enough to prohibit a motivated attacker from taking over the network. This was a
high risk in 2014 for Litecoin and Dogecoin, which use the same hashing algorithm. If either system’s
miners had decided to collude and attack the other blockchain, they could do so with devastating
affects [39].
On July 20th, 2016, the Ethereum blockchain successfully completed a hard fork12 [32]. ETC
(Ethereum Classic – the chain that did not fork) has around 16% of the hashing power of Ethereum,
which leads to a vulnerability in the ETC system. If the Ethereum miners wanted to attack the ETC
network, they could do so very easily.
The security that comes with the network effect and higher hashing power of existing cryptocur-
rencies is the main reason why creating our own private cryptocurrency is not the best choice – we
choose instead to leverage the power of existing blockchain platforms.
3.2 Anonymous Alt-Coins
3.2.1 ZCash and zk-SNARKs
Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) give cryptocur-
rency users the ability to hide all transaction data [21]. Zk-SNARKs require the sender to produce
a proof, in zero-knowledge, of the ability to spend an amount greater than or equal to the value of
the transaction they are submitting. Zk-SNARKs satisfy perfect completeness and computational
soundness properties, in addition to the property of succinctness, which simply means that the proof
is polynomial in the security parameter.
The proofs are currently computationally expensive to produce [23], taking several minutes to
generate a key pair, and several more to generate a zero knowledge proof, but this is an active
research area. The proofs are, however, very computationally efficient to verify, and the signatures
are very small in size – 322 bytes for the signature, and “a few milliseconds” for the verification [75].
ZCash is a cryptocurrency which attempts to address the lack of privacy in blockchain transaction
through use of zk-SNARKs. ZCash uses zk-SNARKs over a merkle tree that contains all previous
transactions. Used naively, this could leak information about the latest transaction, as the transaction
would be in the most recent set but not the previous one. To prevent this, the merkle tree is of constant
size, 264 [55] – for scale, if ZCash transactions occur at an average rate of 1000 transactions per second,
it would take around 292 million years for the merkle tree to be filled.
ZCash is based on Zerocash which itself is an improvement of a protocol called Zerocoin, designed
by a team of researchers at John Hopkins University in 2013 [64]. Zerocoin was designed to work atop
the bitcoin blockchain system, with transaction origin hidden through a process involvingminting and
pouring of coins off the bitcoin blockchain and into zerocoins to obfuscate the otherwise transparent
bitcoin transactions.
Zerocoin was implemented as an extension to bitcoin, but was not commonly used, due to efficiency
problems and imperfections of the scheme [20]. Most importantly, using Zerocoin requires a 25kb proof
to be produced for every coin spent, resulting in a total transaction size of 49kB. The transactions also
11Formerly it was thought that an attack required control of 51% of the network [28], more recently it has been shown
that adversaries can negatively influence the system with 34% or less [45]
12A change to the accepted blockchain protocol – in this case, it was an irregular state change in order to return
stolen funds to their original account
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only exist in single-denomination values, meaning many large proofs must be computed, and multiple
transactions sent, in order to transfer a large number of zerocoins.
In 2014, the scheme was extended and renamed Zerocash, a full cryptocurrency that used zk-
SNARKs to protect the transaction value, sender and recipient address [20].
ZCash has since been developed as an independent cryptocurrency with a further refined version
of the Zerocash protocol [55]. The properties that each scheme offers, in addition to the properties
offered by “Zoe”, or ZCash on Ethereum, are summarised in Table 1 below13.
Table 1: A comparison of the zk-SNARK based protocols.
Zerocoin [64] Zerocash [20] ZCash [55] ZoE
Year Proposed 2013 2014 2016 2016
Hides origin X X X X
Hides recipient × X X X
Hides value × × X X
Blockchain Bitcoin14 Zerocash ZCash Ethereum
The property of succinctness allows these schemes to produce proofs that are ‘small’ and quickly
verified in comparison with other zero-knowledge proofs [20]. However, when compared with other
blockchain transactions, the proofs and resulting transactions are very large, and there are stages
which take a considerable amount of time. In Table 2, we compare performance and cost of the
zk-SNARK based cryptocurrencies with Ethereum and the original performance of SNARKs.
Table 2: A comparison of efficiency of zk-SNARK based protocols.
SNARKs for C [21] Zerocoin [64] Zerocash [20] Ethereum
Txn size (bytes) 322 ∼49,000 996 65
Security level (bit) N/A 80/128 128 128
Key gen time (mins) 20 ? 5 0
Prove time (mins) 22 ‘a few’ 1 0
Verify time 4.68 secs 450 ms 5.4 ms ?
All of the schemes based on zk-SNARKs at present require a trusted setup stage – without this,
the secret information used in the construction of the system can be used dishonestly to fake trans-
actions and create new, counterfeit coins. However, even with knowledge of the secret information,
user anonymity cannot be compromised under any threat model, due to the zero-knowledge property
of zk-SNARKs. A multi-party setup is being considered as a way to mitigate against the necessity of
a trusted setup stage [22]. Using N parties, rather than one trusted party, would offer the scheme the
stronger property of security under just one-of-N of the involved parties acting honestly.
3.2.2 Monero and CryptoNote
Monero describes itself as an anonymous cryptocurrency, and uses the CryptoNote protocol to imple-
ment mixing through “Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures (M-LSAGS)
[76].
As of August 2016, Monero has a total market cap of $57,000,000, and a daily transaction volume
of $8,000,000, almost double that of Ethereum, at $4,500,000 [8], both of which are only a fraction of
bitcoin’s $58,000,000.
13The Zerocoin operation time does not include the time required to compute the accumulator used, explained in
[64].
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At present, Monero has implemented a bespoke scheme to provide users with increased privacy,
achieved through use of stealth addresses to hide transaction data, and key images to prevent
double spending [76]. Key images are the result of a one-way function being performed on the given
user’s private key.
Monero use ring signatures in a ‘passive’ mixing protocol [67]. Each transaction is signed using
Monero’s ring signature scheme, which produces a key image, containing information letting third
parties know that the transaction has been formed correctly and is not an attempt to double spend.
Ring signatures are combined with stealth addresses, one time use addresses which are not asso-
ciated with any user. The recipient of the coins can then identify where they are stored by using a
private ‘viewkey’. They can then be spent by this recipient by him forming a ring signature with his
private ‘spending key’ [76].
Stealth addresses were suggested by Bitcoin developer Peter Todd, and are widely used in bitcoin.
The ideas is as follows – instead of having one address, which leads to easy tracing, or having many
addresses, which means a user must store and remember multiple different private keys, stealth ad-
dresses allow user to use multiple addresses as if they were just one – a server handles the multiple
accounts to improve user experience, coin fungibility and user privacy.
Ring signatures are combined with Greg Maxwell’s Confidential Transaction (CT), forming
‘Ring Confidential Transactions’ [62]. CTs are used to hide the value of the transaction, but not the
sender or recipient address. This is achieved through additively homomorphic encryption, resulting
in transactions around 5kB, and proof size 2.5kB [62].
Monero uses an original method in order to hash to an elliptic curve, one that doesn’t not appear
in any reseach papers, although the Monero team claim it is ‘a secure hash function’ [66]. However,
there is no analysis of whether the function output is distributed uniformly at random, leading to it
being accepted as indifferentiable from a random oracle, and whether the implementation is truly one
way. Monero have chosen to use an Edwards curve to base their EC cryptography, due to the higher
speed and, under some definitions, higher level of security offered by Curve25519 [25].
3.3 An Anonymous Cryptocurrency Comparison
The cryptocurrencies discussed above are addressing the privacy problem with different approaches,
and so are appropriate for use in different situations.
For example, ZCash requires a trusted set up stage, but after that the system is entirely anonymous.
Due to the nature of the system and its use of zero-knowledge proofs, after the first transaction
involving a coin, all coins are entirely anonymous and the blockchain is ‘opaque’, revealing nothing
about senders, recipients, or transaction values [55].
Although an essential property for a cryptocurrency with total anonymity, this opaqueness makes
the scheme impossible to audit. It is also impossible to see whether forged coins have entered into the
blockchain system, and so parties involved in the set up process must be trusted to act honestly for
all time.
Ring signature mixes (RMSs) do not offer this same level of anonymity, which results in the
underlying blockchain system remaining auditable. The ‘plausible deniability’ or reduced level of
anonymity provided is sufficient to make statistical analysis cumbersome and unenlightening, but the
scheme as a whole is still possible to audit as a unit. RSMs do not require any additional trust, which
lends well to use within cryptocurrency systems.
RSMSs have much faster generation and verification stages than ZCash style zero-knowledge proofs.
ZCash proofs, although fairly small at 322 bytes, and very fast to verify, take ‘one to two minutes’ to
produce [55].
Linkable ring signatures have applications beyond the blockchain, for example enabling spam
prevention on anonymous online forums or chat rooms, through rate limiting or blocking known
spammer signatures. Another possible use case in that of random authentication from within a group
- for example an attacker would find it much more difficult to perform a DoS attack or otherwise
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change the behaviour of a group of servers if the server requests and responses were signed by a
randomly selected server producing a ring signature, rather than each server providing authentication
by producing a digital signature.
4 Implementation & Methodology
4.1 Our Mixing Contract at a High Level
Assuming that the blockchain is equipped with an adequate scripting language, for example Ethereum’s
Solidity, or Rootstock for bitcoin [59], the unique ring signature based mix scheme is implemented as
follows:
1. A contract is made to verify ring signatures, receive and distribute coins on the blockchain.
Parameters for the specific mix are entered into the contract.
2. Users generate public and private elliptic curve key pairs. These are not the public and private
keys associated with the accounts that the coins are being sent to or from. They are from an
off-chain public key infrastructure. We use randomly generated elliptic curve key-pairs (explored
in more detail in Section 2.1.1)
3. Users wishing to participate in the ring mix send their public key and the agreed denomination
of the cryptocurrency, for example 1 Ether, to the contract. When a sufficient number of users
have sent their public keys to the contract, with sufficient defined in respect to the original
contract parameters, the contract publishes the list of public keys which together form the ring.
4. The intended recipients of the coins from the mix are the holders of the secret keys corresponding
to the public keys submitted to the contract. The recipient can be the same user as the sender,
in which case that person can generate the key pair, or the recipient can be different to the
sender, which requires the recipient of the funds to generate the key pair, and send only the
public key to the sender of the funds.
5. Intended recipients send the signature to the contract. The signature includes a tag, which is
unique to each signer, message, and ring.
6. The contract verifies that the tag is formed correctly, corresponding to one of the public keys in
the ring. The signature and tag will only verify if:
• The message signed is the correct message,
• The ring in question is correct,
• The tag is correctly formed,
• The tag has not been seen before.
7. Funds are released to each sender of a verified signature and tag.
4.2 The Franklin-Zhang URS Scheme
The unique ring signature scheme is as follows, with the signer as the ith user in the ring. We use the
notation ←R, to indicate choosing an element at random from a set, for example tj ←R Zq shows tj
chosen at random from Zq.
• Setup(1λ): For λ the security parameter, choose multiplicative group G with prime order q,
and randomly chosen generator g of G. Choose also two hash functions H and H ′ such that:
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– H : {0, 1}∗ → G
– H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → Zq
Output public parameters pp = (λ, q, G, H, H ′).
• RingGen(1λ, pp): Key generation algorithm for user i:
– xi ←R Zq
– yi ← gxi
Output public key pki = (pp, yi), secret key ski = (pp, xi).
• RingSig(ski, R,m): The below is the protocol to sign message m in the ring with description
R = (pk1, . . . , pkn).
1. For j ∈ [n], j 6= i, we have:
tj , cj ←R Zq,
aj ← gtjycjj ,
bj ← H(m||R)tj (H(m||R)xi)cj .
2. For j = i, we have:
ri ←R Zq,
ai ← gtjycjj ,
bi ← H(m||R)ri .
3. Calculate ci ← [H ′(m,R, {aj , bj}n1 )−
∑
j 6=i cj ] mod q,
ti ← ri − cixi mod q.
4. Return (R,m,H(m||R)xi , c1, t1, . . . , cn, tn).
• RingVer(R,m, σ):
Parsing the output of RingSig, and using the notation H(m||R)xi = τ , we perform the com-
parison:
n∑
1
cj = H
′(m,R, {gtjycjj , H(m||R)tjτ cj}n1 ).
There is an important line given in this scheme, with important implications to note that when
implementing this scheme over ECs. Starting from an assignment given in the scheme, we have:
ti ← ri − cixi mod q, =⇒ ri = ti + cixi =⇒ gri = gtigcixi =⇒ gri = gti(gxi)ci =⇒ gri = gtiycii .
Although these implications hold unconditionally over the integers, when defined over elliptic
curves we much instead define them modulo the order of the generator of the EC in question, rather
than the generator of the base field.
In our implementation, the generator order is labelled n – when instead, the exponents of the
generator are expressed modulo q, equalities such as gcixi = (gxi)ci , which are essential for correct,
pubic verification of the scheme, as the precomputed gxi is a public constant, but xi itself is not.
4.2.1 The Franklin-Zhang URS Construction
Franklin and Zhang’s unique ring signature scheme relies on Blum, Feldman and Micali’s transfor-
mation to the original zero knowledge proof scheme [48]. Blum, Feldman, and Micali (BFM) ap-
plied a transformation to the original zero-knowledge proof scheme, producing a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) scheme, improving greatly on the efficiency of the formerly interactive
scheme [26].
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With a hash function H(·) modelled as a random oracle, it is a known result that setting F = Hx
constructs a pseudo-random function F . As the security of our unique ring signature scheme relies
on the ‘random oracle’ property of this hash function, we must be careful to use a well-distributed
hash function.
Proof of membership is explained most simply as a proof of knowledge of (at least) one of a specific
set of numbers. The notable change is that rather than constructing a random challenge, the challenge
takes into account the randomness that was incorporated the scheme. In the case of the URS, this
randomness corresponds to each of the other public keys in the ring. is included in the scheme as a
way of ‘blinding’ the true signer, as probabilistically, each of the numbers are equally likely to have
been generated at random.
In our scheme, we have:
ai = g
ri = gtiyci = gtigxici (5)
bi = H(m||R)ri = H(m||R)ti(H(m||R)xi)ci (6)
The exponent ti is applied to H(m||R), which acts as a random oracle and is uniformly distributed
in accordance with Franklin and Zhang. The scheme is congruent to a typical zero knowledge proof,
with the following substitutions:
• Random witness: W = gri .
• Random challenge: ci = H ′(m,R, {aj , bj}n1 )− Σcj mod q.
• Response: With ti = ri − cixi mod q, ai and bi are formed as shown in equations (5) and (6)
above.
• Verification: ai = gri = gtiyci = gtigcixi and bi = H(m||R)ri , similarly.
We use the two generators to ensure that the equality holds for both the specific ring and message in
question, and in the general case with the group generator.
An explanation of this proof is given in Appendix D, and is followed by proofs of completeness,
unforgeability and anonymity, which are give in Appendices D, E, and F, respectively. The proofs of
unforgeability and anonymity are explored through games, and adapted from the proofs given in the
Franklin and Zhang paper [48]. The proof of completeness and the exploration of the NIZK scheme
used are new, but were constructed in a straight-forward manner from the URS scheme.
It is also important to note here that as we are constructing these signatures within EC groups,
there are some technicalities which must be addressed for the scheme to work correctly.
4.3 Hashing to Elliptic Curves
The Franklin-Zhang URS scheme requires us to construct a hash of the form:
H : {0, 1}∗ → G.
We have chosen to implement the system over EC groups for both efficiency of implementation
and security, rather than the alternative of multiplicative groups formed by finite prime fields. Hence,
we require a hash function of the form:
H : {0, 1}∗ → E(Fq).
More specifically, we have chosen to implement the scheme over the EC used in both bitcoin and
Ethereum, secp256k1, which is defined in Section 4.3.1.
There are several algorithms that can potentially be used to hash from an arbitrary length string
to an EC group. The simplest methods are “try and increment”, and simply using an existing, secure
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hash function, and multiplying the output by a generator of the EC group in question. Both of these
options are explored below. Other hashing to EC algorithms can be placed into two broad categories:
“Icart-like” functions, based on the algorithms proposed by Icart in his 2009 ‘How to Hash into Elliptic
Curves’ [56], and the more general Shallue-Woestijne-Ulas (SWU) algorithm, proposed in 2006 in the
paper titled ‘Construction of rational points on elliptic curves over finite fields’ [71]. In order for
either scheme to produce a reasonable output, certain criteria must be met by the underlying field
over which the EC group in question is defined. Some common EC choices and their parameters are
displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: A comparison of some common EC parameters.
Source EC Security Parameters
CNSS 2012 p256 128 a = −3, q = 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1
CNSS 2015 p384 192 a = −3, q = 2384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1
CNSS 2015 p521 260 a = −3, q = 2384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1
bitcoin secp256k1 ≈ 128 a = 0, b = 7, q = 2256 − 232 − 977
Bernstein Curve25519 ≈ 128 y2 = x3 + 486662x2 + x, q = 2255 − 19
4.3.1 secp256k1
Bitcoin and Ethereum both use the Koblitz curve secp256k1, recommended by SECG 15 in 2000
[35], over which to perform ECDSA to produce the signatures on transactions [65]. secp256k1 was
chosen over the random secp256r1 in order to avoid having to trust the ‘randomness’ used to generate
the curves parameters, and to avoid the possibility of a backdoor being included in this randomness.
Koblitz curves have a particular structure which allows very fast performance when implementing EC
point addition and multiplication by a scalar [49].
The increased speed in implementation of general elliptic curve arithmetic over secp256k1 also
corresponds to increased efficiency of the fastest known attacks on the ECDLP. As a result of this,
secp256k1 is ‘several bits’ less secure than one would normally expect a 256 bit elliptic curve to be
(which is ∼128) [25]. The use of secp256k1 to secure all money in both the bitcoin and Ethereum
systems has drawn criticism from some researchers [40], but generally the elliptic curve choice is not
thought of as weak.
secp256k1 consists of all the rational points (x, y) ∈ E(Fq) that satisfy16.
y2 = x3 + 7. (7)
4.3.2 Simple Methods
Generator Multiplication Shadowcash is an example of a cryptocurrency that tried to use this
straight-forward but naive approach to ‘hash’ to an elliptic curve point. With G a group generator,
ShadowCash achieves an EC hash output through the construction [66]:
H = SHA3(yi) ·G.
As usual, we have that the public key is formed yi = xi · G, with xi the randomly generated
secret key. Although this seems like a reasonable approach to producing random EC points, using
this method removes all privacy enhancing properties of the scheme, as identifying information can
be revealed without the discrete logarithm problem being solved. Instead, the public key of the
15SECG: Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
16A brief overview of the EC cryptography leading up to how this equation is formed is given in Appendix A.
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signer is trivially revealed, allowing the input and output addresses to be linked in the same way as
a transaction not involving ring signatures.
ShadowCash uses key images in place of Franklin-Zhang’s tags, although they are constructed very
similarly – a ShadowCash key image, τ , is formed:
τ = xi ·Hp(yi).
Rearranging this equation and including the construction of the hash function Hp:
τ = xi · SHA3(yi) ·G
= SHA3(yi) · (xi ·G)
= SHA3(yi) · yi.
It is clear that τ can be produced using only public information – all we require is access to the SHA3
function, and the public key of each individual in the ring. We can produce τ corresponding to each
public key and compare against the tag in each signature, resulting in the signers having only the
pseudonymity they achieve using bitcoin or a similarly unblinded cryptocurrency.
In our case, the identification tag is H(m||R)xi , which corresponds to xi ·H(m||R) when defined
over an elliptic curve group. An analogous attack could be carried out by an adversary with knowledge
of the message being signed, and all public keys belonging to the ring.
Try and Increment This method is applicable to all ECs, however, is probabilistic, so vulner-
able to timing based side channel attacks and will not find a point with certainty. From Icart’s ‘How
to Hash into Elliptic Curves’, with security parameter k, the try and increment scheme is given by
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Try and Increment
Input u.
for i = 0 to k − 1 do
x = u+ i
if x3 + ax+ b is a quadratic residue in Fq then
return Q = (x, (x3 + ax+ b)1/2)
end if
end for
return ⊥
We can use the try and increment method without compromising the security of our scheme as
the input information does not need to be kept secret. So timing or other side channel attacks made
possible through the non-constant time function would reveal nothing besides public information to
the adversary.
There are several well-tested schemes for finding rational points on elliptic curves, such as [71],
[69], [46]. However, as these schemes are not for ‘hashing’ to an elliptic curve, there is no consideration
given to the distribution of the points produced, and the ‘indifferentiability’ of the scheme compared
to with the random oracle model, which is essential for our scheme.
4.3.3 Schemes from Literature
As mentioned above, EC parameters generally have to satisfy some criteria before a known algorithm
can be used with provable security guarantees. Icart-like functions build hash functions of the form
[56]:
H(m) = f(H ′(m)),
26
Table 4: A comparison of several ECs, with typical hash-to-EC function requirements.
Curve q mod 3 q mod 4 q mod 12
p224 1 1 1
p256 1 3 7
p384 2 3 11
p521 1 3 7
secp256k1 1 3 7
with H ′ modelled as a random oracle, and practically implemented with an existing, secure hash
function, and f a hash encoding first suggested, and detailed in full, in Icart’s ‘How to Hash into
Elliptic Curves’ [56]. These actually cannot be used within our specific scheme, as Ethereum’s Virtual
Machine (the EVM) must be purely deterministic, and so the randomness used within these functions
is unavailable. Nevertheless, we will review possibilities in case of future relevance.
With q the order of the underlying field for the elliptic curve (so the Fq used to construct E(Fq)),
Icart’s function requires both that q ≡ 3 mod 4 [56], and also that q ≡ 2 mod 3. secp256k1 satisfies
the former condition, but has q ≡ 1 mod 3, and so neither of these schemes are suitable.
The SWU scheme again requires q ≡ 3 mod 4, which secp256k1 satisfies, but also, for an EC
defined y2 = x3 + ax + b, the scheme requires that a, b 6= 0. As secp256k1 is defined with equation
y2 = x3 + 7, a = 0, and this function cannot be used.
Another scheme, suggested by Brier et al., takes the form H(m) = f(h1(m)) + f(h2(m)) with
h1, h2 independent random oracles with values in Fq, f as Icart’s encoding [29]. However, this also
requires q ≡ 2 mod 3.
A comparison of some typical choices of ECs, and whether they satisfy the necessary criteria, is
shown in Table 4 below.
In elliptic curve groups where the equivalence q ≡ 3 mod 4 holds, square roots modulo q can be
calculated efficiently and deterministically through use of the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm, given below.
A critical review of this algorithm can be found in [60], and notably the algorithm does not run in
constant time, and rather the timing follows a normal distribution.
Definition 4.1. Tonelli-Shanks Algorithm For q an odd prime, with q ≡ 3 mod 4, and n ∈ Fq, the
two square roots of n are u and −u, with u calculated as given:
u = n
q+1
4 mod q.
This can be shown to hold through a very straight-forward deduction, starting with Euler’s crite-
rion.
Definition 4.2. Euler’s Criterion
1. If n is a square modulo q, then n
q−1
2 ≡ 1 mod q.
2. If n is not square modulo q, then n
q−1
2 ≡ −1 mod q.
Another scheme, suggested by Brier et al., takes the form H(m) = f(h1(m)) + f(h2(m)) with
h1, h2 independent random oracles with values in Fq, f as Icart’s encoding [29]. However, this also
requires q ≡ 2 mod 3.
4.4 secp256k1 – not quite a Barreto-Naerhig curve
The anonymity property of the URS scheme we have implemented relies on the hardness of the DDH
problem in the group we are working in [48]. Due to this, if there exists a group pairing, from secp256k1
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to a field in which the DDH problem is trivial to break, even the weakest adversaries would have the
ability to remove the additional anonymity given by the ring signature based mixing scheme.
A pairing-friendly curve is one with an embedding degree that is very low, which leads to the
finite field being mapped to having a small size, and hence low bitwise security. The embedding factor
is the factor by which the storage costs grow when storing the field that the elliptic curve has been
mapped to. With embedding degree d, the field size (of the new field in which we can break the DDH
problem) is 2256·d.
With the underlying finite field Fq defined such that q ≡ 1 mod 3, Barreto-Naehrig curves are
defined with the equation:
y2 = x3 + b, b ∈ Fq.
It is trivial to see that secp256k1 has this form, and it can be shown that the condition on q is also
satisfied, as is given in Table 4.
However, Barreto-Naerhing curves have an embedding degree of d = 12 [19], and secp256k1 specif-
ically has an embedding degree of [25]:
d = 19298 68153955 26992372 61830834 78131797
54729273 79845817 39710086 05235863 60249056. (8)
This means a single pairing value would require 256 · d bits of storage – approximately 5× 1078. Even
with the more optimal d = 12, the finite field with which the elliptic curve group is paired grows to an
extent that the discrete logarithm problem in the finite field requires more computational time than
Pollard’s Rho in the elliptic curve group [19]. Clearly, a pairing-based ECDLP break is not a threat
at present.
4.5 Hashing to Barreto-Naehrig Curves
The scheme we choose to implement works as following. Although technically not a Barreto-Naehrig
curve, secp256k1 satisfies all of the requirements for this hashing to elliptic curve algorithm to work.
This scheme is elegant, deterministic and executes in constant time, eliminating the possibility of side
channel attacks.
The scheme used and its security properties are given in full in Fouque and Tibouchi’s ‘Indif-
ferentiable Hashing to Barreto-Naehrig Curves’ [47]. Importantly, it is proven that the scheme is
indifferentiable from a random oracle. With #E(Fq) defined as the number of rational points on
the elliptic curve in question, the image of the hashing function is approximately 916 · #E(Fq). For
comparison, Icart’s function produces an image of 58 ·#E(Fq) if a 6= 0, and 23 ·#E(Fq) if a = 0 [51].
As we need to use the hashing function to generate the tags and the zero-knowledge proof of
membership, as constructed H(m||R)w, with w = xi, ri, ti, we need the hash to act as a random
oracle in order for the Hw to act as pseudo-random functions as defined in the Franklin and Zhang
paper [48]. The hashing scheme we have implemented is shown in Algorithm 2, with t as input, and
b as defined in the EC equation y2 = x3 + b, with (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq, taken from [47]:
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Algorithm 2 Hashing to a Barreto-Naehrig Curve
input t
w ←
√
3·t
1+b+t2
x1 ← −1+
√−3
2 − tw
x2 ← −1− x1
x3 ← 1 + 1w2
r1, r2, r3 ←R F∗q
α← χq(r21 · (x31 + b))
β ← χq(r22 · (x32 + b))
i← [(α− 1) · β mod 3] + 1
return (xi, χq(r23 · t) ·
√
x31 + b).
χ is a function defined in the Foque and Tibouchi paper such that:
χ(a) =

0, if a = 0,
1, if a is a square,
−1, otherwise.
We construct the χq function for use within the hashing algorithm using Euler’s Criterion as
previous defined, with q the order of the desired output EC group. This is possible due to secp256k1
satisfying q ≡ 3 mod 4, as explained previously.
Using this scheme as H, and SHA-256 as H ′, we can very easily and efficiently implement the full
unique ring signature algorithm, using only either Ethereum or bitcoin’s existing dependencies.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Privacy
There is a real risk of all but one of the participating parties in the mixing contract, either through a
Sybil attack or collusion, revealing their tags or secret keys, and so eliminating themselves from the
anonymity group, and therefore linking the honest user’s input and output addresses.
There are several ways to mitigate against this. Chaum blinding could be used to prevent this
attack from occurring, or we could punish users who reveal their signatures, in order to keep the
scheme auditable. The more suitable option would be decided based on the use case – for example,
in a financial environment or in a consortium use case, simply punishing users may be the easier
and preferable option. Alternatively, we could randomly allocate the mix that users get entered into,
which would make coordinating such a de-anonymising attack much more difficult.
Otherwise, the privacy of the scheme relies on ECDDH, which itself is closely related to ECDLP,
which has been described as ‘the hardest math problem ever’ [68]. Although currently less efficient
than even a brute force attack, index calculus style attacks are being developed against certain EC
groups, for example p-224. As p-224 also does not satisfy the requirements for any known hashing
to EC function that is indifferentiable from a random oracle, it is not a wise choice for use in this
scheme.
Although transactions can be split across multiple mixes and the total transaction value can be
obfuscated in this way, we have not directly incorporated hiding of transaction value within our
scheme.
29
5.2 Scheme Security
The scheme we have implemented is secure under the EC-DDH assumption in the random oracle
model. Before proving soundness, completeness and anonymity, we must formally define them in
relation to our scheme. Franklin and Zhang start the proof that the zero-knowledge proof scheme is
sound, but do not finish the proof or extend to the unique ring signature protocol.
The authors specifically say that it is more efficient in both the signing and verification algorithms
than those suggested in ‘Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures in Ad Hoc Groups’, by
Liu, Wei, and Wong [2004].
Security is generally described through ‘games’ - interactions between a challenger and a compu-
tationally bound adversary, with restrictions based on the threat model of the scheme. This is how
the security level of the protocol is produced, as shown by the security proofs detailed in Appendices
D, E, and F.
5.3 Efficiency
Although the scheme is noted as being sub-linear in the number of users in the ring, it holds rather
that the tag is sub-linear (in fact, constant size), but the full signature, as we have seen before, is
constructed as:
σ = τ , m, R, {ci, ti}n1
= τx, τy, m, R, {ci, ti}n1
Depending on the construction of the contract which uses this ring signature scheme, it may be
possible to simply send τ and {ci, ti}n1 . However, as each ci and ti are 32 bytes, and taking into
account τ , this signature is still 64(n+ 1) bytes in length. Contrasting with ZCash, where each proof
is 322 bytes, we achieve a shorter signature length for rings with size n < 4, but a zk-SNARK is
smaller for n ≥ 5.
However, ZCash is currently running on a ‘test-net’ only, and the fully functional version is due
for release in October 2016 [55]. Our ring signature scheme, although expensive to implement on
Ethereum, is ready to be used. The compromise between anonymity guarantees and scheme usability
is at the discretion of the user, but zk-SNARKs would required a large improvement in key and proof
generations times until they are comparable to URS-based mixing schemes in this aspect.
5.4 Usability
It may be possible to implement the scheme in a more user-friendly manner in the future. For example,
more of the mixing contract may be automated, for example setting up rings in an ad-hoc way, and
removing the necessity of sender and recipient interaction.
For transactions of large value or if there is not a lot of liquidity in the scheme, we could dynamically
adjust the timings of the coin mixes so as to increase anonymity as much as possible. For example,
if a large transaction is sent, rather than hoping there are other transactions of the same value for
the scheme to mix among, we will split the transaction into denominations with high liquidity and
mix. We may be able to further improve the anonymity of this scheme by not including all of these
segments of the transaction in the same block, unlinking the input and output addresses of the full,
larger transaction so as to make the large transaction less conspicuous even under careful blockchain
analysis. We could do this automatically, although we would need to implement the scheme in a
completely different way, as the senders and recipients may no longer be able to interact with just one
contract.
Another idea for consideration, if sub-linear linkable ring signatures were available, would be to
include all previously used public keys in the ring. We could do this up to a predefined maximum,
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and select the public keys to be used at random, so that analysis the ring of one transaction and the
ring of the previous transaction would not give away the second signer, as theirs would be the only
public key not common to the two sets. We could also look into hashing the set of public keys, rather
than appending them in the signature, to reduce signature size.
6 Conclusions, Summary, Further Work
6.1 Conclusions
This research has examined the existing solutions to the lack of inherent privacy for individuals in
current blockchain systems. The research showed that there are schemes that offer anonymity on the
blockchain, and schemes that offer a form of anonymity that we refer to as plausible deniability. Both
of these have their possible limitations – for the truly anonymous blockchain systems, there is an
‘opaqueness’ to the once transparent ledger of transactions, and their is additional trust required to
construct such a scheme. For the platforms offering ‘plausible deniability’, there are often vulnerabil-
ities introduced to the scheme privacy due to incorrect implementation or practical limitations such
as small anonymity groups, and there are ways for a motivated adversary to subvert the privacy of
existing schemes functioning in this way.
There are no schemes or systems currently available or proposed that enable a blockchain platform
to retain some of its transparency, while enabling individual users to remain truly anonymous.
6.2 Summary
We have explored cryptographic protocols, specifically concentrating on Franklin and Zhang’s unique
ring signature protocol. We have implemented this scheme over secp256k1, enabling compatibility
with both bitcoin and Ethereum’s EC libraries.
We have clarified an essential condition for a URS to be constructed correctly over an EC group
- all variables given in the Franklin-Zhang algorithm that are intended to be used as exponents, or
rather as a scalar multiplier of a point in the EC group, must be defined modulo the EC group
generator order, rather than the order of underlying finite field.
We have evaluated the security of the scheme, the privacy offered by the scheme, and the common
vulnerabilities introduced by imperfect implementations of similar protocols.
6.3 Further Work
There are many open problems in this general area, ranging from constructing a blinding system
that works alongside linkable or unique ring signatures, to making existing linkable ring signature
schemes more efficient and scalable. Sub-linear unique ring signatures exist, although they are based
on bilinear pairings of ECs, and so implementing them is a much larger project than this one.
We could use a tree structure to produce a proof of knowledge of one public key of the many
potentially contained on the leaves of the tree – this structure would allow proofs to be verified in
logarithmic space and time [73], and can be instantiated as a zero-knowledge proof.
There are large improvements to be made in the efficiency of the Ethereum Virtual Machine, where
our final scheme will be implemented. At present, it has ‘precompiles’ for verifying ECDSA, querying
RIPE160 and SHA256, but there are only basic implementations of arbitrary precision big integer
arithmetic, and no elliptic curve arithmetic other than ECDSA verification.
We could also approach the privacy problem with zk-SNARKs, exploring options to implement
them in such a way that the blockchain platform as a whole remains a publicly verifiable system.
As each potential solution is made up of many cryptographic protocols, there are many areas where
efficiencies can still be gained, or security of schemes can be improved.
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Appendices
A Homogeneous Elliptic Curve Equations
Elliptic curves are defined as the coordinate points that satisfy the following (Weierstrass) equation.
Formally, for a finite field Fq, with q a prime power, and algebraic closure of Fq (which is the set⋃
m≥1 Fqm), we have the equation below defining an elliptic curve:
Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 = X3 + a2X
2Za4XZ
2 + a5Z
3, (9)
with a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 ∈
⋃
m≥1 Fqm . We call Fq the base field for the elliptic curve group.
The equation shown in (9) is called the homogeneous or projective Weierstrass equation, and is
defined up to equivalence in the projective plane, P 2(Fq). The equivalence is a simple linear relation
acting on (Fq)3\{(0, 0, 0)} with (x1, y1, z1) ∼ (x2, y2, z2) if and only if there exists u ∈ F∗q such that
x1 = ux2, y1 = uy2, and z1 = uz2. The points (X,Y, Z) satisfying equation (9) above form an
equivalence class of projective points (X : Y : Z).
An elliptic curve, formally, is the set of all solutions in P (
⋃
m≥1 Fq) of a smooth Weierstrass
equation. To define smooth in this context, we first rearrange equation (9), to form:
F (X,Y, Z) = Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 −X3 − a2X2Z − a4XZ2 − a5Z3 = 0. (10)
A smooth curve is one which has no points at which all of ∂F∂X ,
∂F
∂Y , and
∂F
∂Z vanish. In other words,
at least one partial derivative of F must be non-zero at each point satisfying F (X,Y, Z). The point
with Z = 0, (0 : 1 : 0) acts as the ‘point at infinity’, and in affine coordinates, is represented by a line
at plus and minus infinity on the y axis. This point at infinity acts as the additive zero element.
As the curve in homogeneous form is a linear equivalence class, we can divide each of X, Y and
Z by Z, thus giving Z as 1, a constant that we needn’t write down, and with x = XZ and y =
Y
Z we
produce the affine coordinates of the curve.
B Elliptic Curve Arithmetic & ECDSA
Arithmetic in elliptic curve groups does not occur as one may naively assume, with (x1, y1)+(x2, y2) =
(x1 + x2, y1 + y2). Instead, point addition, point doubling and scalar point multiplication take place
through the formulae given below.
Point Addition For simple point addition, (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x3, y3), with (x1 6= x2), we form
(x3, y3) through the following:
For λ =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 , (11)
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, (12)
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1. (13)
It is clear here that λ is formed by taking the gradient between the two points, and addition
formed in accordance with the elliptic curve equation.
Point Doubling For y1 6= 0, we set λ = 3x1+a2y1 , and use the formulae for x3 and y3 as given above.
We see that λ here is the tangential gradient of the point we are doubling, formed through
differentiation of the elliptic curve equation. Special cases, such as when y1 = 0, are explained
in detail in Menezes’ Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems [63].
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Scalar Multiplication Scalar multiplication occurs through repeated point doubling, much as ex-
ponentiation over the integers gx can be calculated through multiplying g by itself x times.
ECDSA ECDSA signatures are formed of pairs, (r, s), constructed as follows.
With k a random nonce, r is first formed r = (k ·g)x (the x coordinate of the elliptic curve point
given by k · g). s is then constructed s = z+r·dk , with d the private key, z the hash of the signed
message authorising the transaction.
If k is known, for example due to low entropy sources of randomness being used, we will be
able to calculate the private key, as all other information is public. Reusing k and d together
also gives adversaries all information needed to calculate the private key. This has happened
several times in the history of bitcoin, leading to losses of up to $58 million [40]. RFC6979 is
suggested as a deterministic source of randomness, both to increase security against low entropy
randomness, and against the potential for backdoors to be introduced through manipulated
sources of randomness [40].
C The Franklin and Zhang NIZK Proof
The Franklin and Zhang paper gives the assumption (without loss of generality) that logH(m||R)τ =
loggyi [48]. This assumption is critical in the proof. The explanation for its formation is as follows,
starting from construction:
τ = H(m||R)xi , yi = gxi
=⇒ xi = logH(m||R)(τ ) = logg(yi)
=⇒ logH(m||R)(τ ) = logg(yi).
From this assumption, the following proof system is constructed [48]:
1. For j ∈ [n] and j 6= i, prover selects cj , tj ←R Zq, and computes aj ← gtjycjj and bj ←
H(m)tj (H(m)xi)cj ; for j = i, prover selects ri ←R Zq and computes ai ← gri and bi ← H(m)ri .
Prover then sends the set {aj , bj}n1 to the verifier.
2. Verifier sends challenge, formed c←R Zq, to the prover.
3. Prover computes ci ← c −
∑
j 6=i cj and t ← r − cixi mod q, sends the pairs c1, t1, . . . , cn, tn to
the verifier.
4. Verifier accepts if and only if aj = gtjy
cj
j and bj = H(m)
tjτ cj , for all j ∈ [n].
D Completeness
We need only prove that a correctly formed signature always verifies. Therefore, our proof seeks to
show:
n∑
1
cj
?
= H ′(m,R, {gtjycjj , H(m||R)tjτ cj}n1 ).
By definition, we have j 6= i, cj ←R Zq, ci ← H ′(m,R, {aj , bj}n1 )− [
∑
j 6=i cj ] mod q, which gives:
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n∑
1
cj =
∑
j 6=i
cj +H
′(m,R, {aj , bj}n1 )−
∑
j 6=i
cj ,
=⇒
n∑
1
cj = H
′(m,R, {aj , bj}n1 ) = H ′(m,R, {aj , bj}j 6=i, {ai, bi})
⇐⇒ {aj , bj}n1 = {aj , bj}j 6=i, {ai, bi}
For j 6= i, by construction we have aj = gtjycjj , and bj = H(m||R)tj (H(m||R)xi)cj .
Using the definition τ = H(m||R)xi (constructed with a valid secret key xi), we see that the
verification equation holds unconditionally by definition for j 6= i.
For the case j = i, we need to prove the equivalence,
{ai, bi} = {gri , H(m||R)ri} ?= {gtiycii , H(m||R)tiτ ci}.
We here must use the construction of ti in order to show the sides of the equation are equivalent.
Again this assumes knowledge of a valid secret key xi, as ti is defined ti = ri − cixi.
Taking the first element, ai, and using the knowledge that yi = gxi , we see that:
gri = gtigxici =⇒ gri = gri−cixigxici =⇒ gri = gri
The proof of equivalence on the other element works similarly, replacing g with H(m||R). 
E Unforgeability
This proof is completed through a series of games, suggested and briefly explored in [48]. We let Wi
be the event that the adversary, A, succeeds in Game i.
Game 0
The original unforgeability experiment between challenger and adversary, A, is described as follows:
Let (R∗,m∗, σ∗) be the output of adversary A, let W0 be the event that A succeeds in producing
a verifiable triple, under the conditions that R∗ ⊆ T\CU (with T defined below in the key generation
stage), and CU as the set of keys of corrupted users, which the adversary has access to.
In short, this means that the adversary must produce a signature with a key pair which they
have not been explicitly given. We also have the condition that A has never queried RS(·, ·, ·) with
(·, R∗,m∗), and obviously we must have Ver(R∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1.
By definition, with AdvufRS(A) meaning the advantage of adversary A in relation to the unforge-
ability property on the ring signing algorithm, and Pr[w0] as the probability of success in the game
above, we have:
AdvufRS(A) = Pr[W0].
Generation of n Public Keys Challenger chooses x, y ←R Zq, and computes DDH triple
(defined in section 1) (g,X, Y, Z), such that X = gx, Y = gy, and Z = gxy. For all i ∈ [n], challenger
randomly selects xi ←R Zq and calculates pki ← X · gxi , and gives T = {pki}ni=1 to the adversary A.
We have that:
AdvufRS(A) = Pr[W0].
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Game 1
Verification The final forgery (R∗,m∗, (τ∗, pi∗)) checks ∃i ∈ [n] such that pki ∈ R∗, and (g, pki,
H(m∗||R∗)ski , τ∗) is a DDH triple. This means that given g, pki and either H(m∗||R∗)ski or τ∗, it is
impossible to determine which of the latter two elements you have received.
With A1 an adversary that attacks the adaptive soundness property of the underlying NIZK proof
system, we have that:
Pr[W0]− Pr[W1] ≤ Advsound(P,V ) (A1).
This probability is bounded in real terms by (qh + 1)/q, with 1 occurring only if the adversary did
not query the H ′ oracle during its attempted forgery.
Game 2
Game 2 builds on Game 1 to include a simulator S to simulate the NIZK proof of queried signatures.
We have here that, for an adversary that attacks the adaptive security of the NIZK proof in Franklin
and Zhang’s ‘Framework for Unique Ring Signatures’:
Pr[W1]− Pr[W2] ≤ Advzk(P,V )(A2)
Game 3
Game 3 is an adaptation of Game 2, with the DDH triple provided replaced with a random tuple.
Any adversary that can distinguish between the DDH and random triple can be converted into an
adversary, here called A3, who can solve the DDH problem. That is,
Pr[W2]− Pr[W3] ≤ AdvddhG (A3).
Due to this, we have here that Pr[W3] ≤ n/q.
The following result holds, concluding the unforgeability proof:
AdvufRS(A) ≤ AdvddhG (A3) + (2qh + n+ 1)/q.
F Anonymity
This work is an adaptation of the proofs presented in ‘A Framework for Unique Ring Signatures’ [48].
The proof takes place through a series of three games, defined below.
Game 0
Let Game 0 be the original anonymity experiment between challenger and adversary, A. Assume A
makes at most qh queries to either H or H ′, and at most qs queries to the signing oracle as defined
below. The game takes place in a setting where the adversary is given the ability to query the hash
and signing oracles, and must distinguish between correctly formed and random chosen triples.
Generation of n Public Keys Challenger chooses x, y ←R Zq, and computes DDH triple
(defined in section 1) (g,X, Y, Z), such that X = gx, Y = gy, and Z = gxy. For all i ∈ [n], challenger
randomly selects xi ←R Zq and calculates pki ← X · gxi , and gives T = {pki}ni=1 to the adversary A.
We see all public keys here have been chosen independently, at random.
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Queries to H Challenger maintains set V , constructed (m,R, h, u), initially empty. Responses
to hash queries (of the form (mj , Rj)) are not as straight forward as simply hashing the input - instead,
the hash queries are formed like queries to a random oracle constructed in the following way:
• Challenger randomly selects d←R Zq.
• In response to a hash query on (mj , Rj), challenger checks if ∃(mj , Rj , hj , uj) ∈ V for any hj , uj .
• If so, challenger returns hj .
• If not, challenger randomly selects uj ←R Zq, constructs hj ← Y d · guj , returns hj and adds
(mj , Rj , hj , uj) to set V .
Queries to H ′ Challenger maintains set V ′, constructed (m,R, {aj , bj}n1 , c), initially empty.
Responses to hash queries (of the form (m′, R′, {a′j , b′j}n1 )) work as follows:
• Challenger checks if there exists (m′, R′, {a′j , b′j}n1 , c′) in V ′.
• If so, challenger returns c′.
• If not, challenger picks random c′ ←R Zq, returns this c′, and adds (m′, R′, {a′j , b′j}n1 , c′) to V ′.
Signing Queries Signing queries consider two encapsulated adversarial parties, as follows.
• Adversary A queries the signing oracle with an input of the form (j, R,m).
• Adversary B queries H and receives h constructed h← Y d · gu.
• Challenger computes τ ← Zd · Xu · Y dxj · gxju, computes corresponding NIZK proof pi, using
secret key of user j.
• Challenger returns (m,R, τ, pi) to A.
Challenge Adversary A requests challenge (i0, i1, R∗,m∗), with m∗ to be signed with respect to
ring R∗, and i0, i1 ∈ [n] indices such that pki0 , pki1 ∈ T ∩ R∗ Define T in the Anonymity games so
that it’s known already here. Or define here. Challenger randomly chooses bit b ←R {0, 1}, returns
challenge signature RS(skib , R∗,m∗) to A. A cannot query RS(·, ·, ·) with (i0, R∗,m∗) or (i1, R∗,m∗).
Output Adversary A outputs b′ as its guess.
Game 1
Game 1 is similar to Game 0, but when responding to a signing query (j, m, R), the challenger
simply simulates the proof. c1, t1, . . . , cn, tn are chosen randomly from Zq, and aj = gtjy
cj
j and
bj = H(m||R)tjτ cj are computed for each j ∈ [n]. We let W1 be the event of A’s success at Game
1. It is obvious to deduce that if there exists an adversary A1 that can attack the adaptive NIZK
property of the fundamental NIZK proof system (P, V ), the following holds:
Pr[W0]− Pr[W1] ≤ Advzk(P,V )(A1).
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Game 2
In Game 2, the signing oracle is modified, such that the DDH triple is replaced by a random triple.
Adversary A can only notice the difference with negligible probability, under the DDH assumption.
Specifically, the challenger simply replaces Z with some Zˆ where Zˆ = gc and c ←R Zq. Let W2 be
the event that A succeeds in Game 2. We can show that there exists an adversary A2 such that:
Pr[W1]− Pr[W2] ≤ AdvddhG (A2), P r[W2] = 0.5.
Finally, we can combine the equations produced for each individual game, to give the result:
AdvanonRS (A) ≤ AdvddhG (A2) + qh/q.
42
